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MONETARY POLICY ACTIONS AND THE INCENTIVE TO INVEST 
THE "VALUE OF WAITING" MAY OVERWHELM LOW INTEREST RATES 
Abstract 
The ability of monetary policy actions to affect the private sector's incentive to invest in fixed 
capital is hotly debated.  Whereas a downward shift in the yield curve increases the present value 
of expected cash flows and should spur investment, lower short-term interest rates make delay 
more desirable.  These influences work against each other so the net effect of stimulative 
monetary policy actions could go either way.  This article outlines a simple investment decision 
rule that captures both effects of changing interest rates.  It also clarifies why monetary policy 
actions that shift the yield curve may or may not affect fixed investment. 
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MONETARY POLICY ACTIONS AND THE INCENTIVE TO INVEST 
Many economists and policymakers consider business fixed investment ("fixed private 
nonresidential investment" in the national accounts) to be an important transmission channel for 
monetary policy actions.  Moreover, business fixed investment may be a leading economic 
indicator.  Although business fixed investment accounted for only 9 to 14 percent of GDP in any 
quarter between 1960 and 2003, it accounted for about 24 percent of GDP growth during the two 
years following the recessions of 1969-70 and 1981-82.  Also, declines in business investment 
spending typically lead the economy into recession, most recently during late 2000 in advance of 
the 2001 recession. 
The decision to invest depends critically on the opportunity cost of capital⎯that is, the rate 
at which future cash flows are discounted.  For given cash flow expectations, the lower the cost of 
capital, the more potential investment projects are profitable and hence should be implemented.  
Although the Federal Reserve does not exert direct control over the cost of capital, monetary 
policy may affect the incentive to invest in important ways.  This article adapts a recently 
developed model to highlight the complex link between monetary policy actions and the private 
sector's incentive to invest. 
The Net Present Value Rule 
The simple textbook net present value (NPV) rule states that a given project should be 
undertaken if (and only if) its NPV⎯that is, the sum of its discounted cash flows⎯is positive.  
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where k  is the (marginal) opportunity cost of capital and the CF are (point estimates of 
uncertain) end-of-period incremental cash flows (i.e., in excess of the firm's existing cash flows, 
some of which may be crowded out by the new project). 
The marginal cost of capital, k , should reflect only the market-related⎯that is, 
systematic⎯risk of the project (rather than the firm).  It is merely an extension of the 
Modigliani-Miller theorem to say that the "risk that is relevant in computing a project's cost of 
capital is the risk of the project's cash flows and not the risk of the financing instrument (e.g., 
stocks, bonds) the firm issues to finance the project."  This is why there is no uniform value for 
the cost of capital of a given company.  In fact, companies "should adopt a policy of using 
different costs of capital, at least at the divisional level" (Bodie and Merton, 2000). 
Although the NPV rule generally is correct in a static world, it is by now well-known that it 
does not always give the correct answer from a dynamic perspective (that is, when there are 
multiple decision points).  The NPV rule might lead to an inefficient investment decision if 
projects available today can be delayed until tomorrow.  If a project can be delayed, it might be 
worthwhile to wait even if the NPV of undertaking the project today is positive.  Such a situation 
arises if the value of waiting is higher than the NPV of starting the project today, possibly 
because the marginal cost of capital, k , is likely to be lower tomorrow.  In other words, there 
might be value in waiting to undertake business fixed investment even if the project is currently 
profitable. 
A positive value of waiting exists only where investment is irreversible and where, at the 
same time, uncertainty about a parameter pertinent to the investment decision will be resolved at 
a future date.  Irreversibility exists if a project undertaken today cannot be reversed at zero cost 
tomorrow.  In other words, there is irreversibility if the investor's decision today bears on the 
choice set available to the investor tomorrow⎯a sort of path dependency.  A candidate variable   Monetary Policy Actions and the Incentive to Invest – January 23, 2004 - Page 4 of 14 
for resolution of uncertainty is the opportunity cost of capital.  For given cash flow expectations, 
it might be worthwhile for an investor to wait to undertake the investment, re-evaluating the 
investment again at a future date at the then-prevailing cost of capital.  Given that many 
investment projects are, at least in part, irreversible, the existence of a value of waiting is a 
fundamental insight.  What is more, modeling the investment as a decision to exercise a call 
option (versus keeping it alive by not investing) allows us to derive the value of waiting and its 
relation to economic uncertainty. 
Monetary Policy Actions and the Decision to Invest 
Monetary policy actions are widely believed to be important for business fixed investment, 
yet decades of academic research largely have failed to pin down the relationship.  In other 
words, policymakers' confidence that such a relationship exists contrasts sharply with a dearth of 
agreed theoretical explanations of this key link between the financial sector and the real economy.  
One possible flaw in many theoretical models linking monetary policy actions and business 
investment is their failure to account for the timing option that may be embedded in investment 
decisions.  This, in turn, results from the tendency to build static models in which there is only 
one decision point.  In the real world, of course, many investment projects that are passed over 
today may be undertaken tomorrow.  In a sense, therefore, investment projects may compete with 
themselves at different points in time. 
A recent contribution to the dynamic investment literature by Jonathan B. Berk (1999) 
derives an investment decision rule that incorporates the impact of monetary policy actions on 
both the cost of capital and the value of waiting.  In earlier research, Ingersoll and Ross (1992) 
had analyzed the value of waiting to invest in the presence of nonstochastic (constant) real cash 
flows and stochastic (randomly varying) real interest rates.  These authors showed that the effect 
of a monetary policy action—there defined as a parallel shift in the Treasury yield curve—has   Monetary Policy Actions and the Incentive to Invest – January 23, 2004 - Page 5 of 14 
ambiguous effects on fixed investment activity.  This is because changes in the level of interest 
rates affect both the present value of cash flows (through the discount rate) and the value of 
waiting to invest (through the real option consisting of timing). 
Consider a monetary policy action that causes the yield curve to move down.  On the one 
hand, lower interest rates at all maturities along the yield curve would increase the present value 
of future cash flows, increasing the incentive to invest.  This is the effect that most investment 
models capture and which shapes the conventional wisdom.  On the other hand, the lower yield 
curve also implies a lower opportunity cost of waiting to invest due to the lower short-term rate.  
In effect, the urgency to make a decision declines.  What's more, monetary policy actions might 
increase uncertainty about future real interest rates.  This could make the option to wait even 
more valuable.  All things considered, Ingersoll and Ross conclude that no general statement can 
be made about how monetary policy actions affect fixed investment incentives. 
Building on Ingersoll and Ross's insight that waiting to invest means keeping alive a call 
option on the opportunity cost of capital, Berk (1999) presented a simple investment rule that 
offers an unambiguous theoretical relationship between market interest rates and fixed 
investment.  This option-adjusted⎯that is, value-of-waiting adjusted⎯investment rule tells the 


















where k  and CF are defined as above,  0
c r  is the current callable risk-free rate with the maturity 
of the final cash flow of the project, and  0 r  is the current duration-matched non-callable risk-free 
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The difference between inequality (2) and the traditional NPV rule is the quotient 
00 /
c rr ⎯the ratio of callable long and non-callable duration-matched risk-free interest rates.  A 
higher ratio of callable to non-callable rates makes waiting relatively attractive, whereas a lower 
ratio makes waiting comparatively unattractive, all else equal.  This is because a high revealed 
value of the embedded call option implies that the market places relatively large probability 
weight on the possibility that long-term interest rates will be lower in the future than they are 
today. 
The implicit assumption of the option-adjusted NPV rule shown in inequality (2) is that all 
variables are real, that is, adjusted for inflation expectations.  This is because the cash flows of the 
project in question are assumed to be independent of whether the project is undertaken today (at 
0 = t ) or in the future.  If the variables were in nominal dollar terms, the cash flow stream of a 
project would not necessarily be independent of the project's starting point.  For example, all cash 
flows would be 10 percent higher in dollar (nominal) terms if the project were delayed and the 
general price level rose by 10 percent in the interim. 
To build intuition, let us assume for a moment a world without inflation.  In such a world 
with no inflation (and no accompanying inflation uncertainty), the option-adjusted NPV 
rule⎯inequality (2)⎯provides an unambiguous link between business fixed investment and the 
ratio of a long-term callable default-free rate to a duration-matched non-callable default-free rate.  
This unambiguous link makes the ratio of callable to non-callable interest rates a fail-safe gauge 
of the impact of a monetary policy action on the incentive to invest.  For instance, if the Federal 
Reserve, in an attempt to ease financial conditions by cutting the federal funds rate, is able to 
depress the ratio of the long callable to the duration-matched non-callable default-free rates, then 
the Fed succeeds in increasing the incentive to invest.  Otherwise, the monetary policy action 
increases the value of waiting more than the NPV of investing today.   Monetary Policy Actions and the Incentive to Invest – January 23, 2004 - Page 7 of 14 
In a world without inflation, default-free callable bond yields would be readily available 
from GNMA ("Ginnie Mae") pass-through mortgage-backed securities (MBS).  (GNMA is the 
Government National Mortgage Association, a federal government agency; like Treasuries, 
GNMA securities carry the full faith and credit of the U.S. government.)  Pass-through MBS 
inherit the cash-flow characteristics of 30-year fixed-rate mortgages, which can be prepaid at par 
at the discretion of the borrower (mortgager).  Thus, a mortgage effectively is composed of a 
long-term non-callable bond plus an embedded call option that gives the mortgager the right (but 
not the obligation) to buy back (call) the bond at par.  The value of the embedded call option 
(written by the mortgagee on long-term nominal interest rates) is reflected in the ratio of GNMA 
to Treasury yields.  The resulting option value captures the value of waiting.  Waiting is valuable 
because interest rates are stochastic and, thus, the opportunity cost of capital may be lower 
tomorrow than it is today.  A high ratio of GNMA to Treasury yields indicates that waiting is 
relatively attractive because the market attaches a high probability to the possibility that 
long-term interest rates will drop. 
Implementing the Option-Adjusted Cost of Capital 
We now calculate the Berk (1999) option-adjusted real cost of capital for the U.S. corporate 
sector.  Because the Berk investment decision rule was derived for a world without inflation, we 
must make adjustments for inflation expectations.  As the ratio of the (nominal) callable and non-
callable default-free rates we take the ratio of the GNMA 30-year yield to the 10-year T-note 
yield; this is to match durations.  We measure inflation expectations by the difference in 10-year 
constant maturity yields between nominal off-the-run Treasury securities and inflation-indexed 
Treasury securities, calculated from smoothed zero-coupon yield curves.  Unlike survey measures 
of inflation expectations, the yield spread between nominal and inflation-indexed securities is 
based on actual (investment) decisions.  On the other hand, as discussed by Sack (2000) and 
McCulloch (2003), the TIPS spread is a noisy (because of thin trading) and possibly biased   Monetary Policy Actions and the Incentive to Invest – January 23, 2004 - Page 8 of 14 
measure of the expected rate of inflation because of embedded liquity and inflation-risk 
premiums.  Also, as argued by Schmid (2003), the TIPS spread tends to overshoot in response to 
montary policy actions. 
Finally, we measure the marginal cost of capital by the sum of the yield of the on-the-run 
10-year TIPS and an (unobservable) equity risk premium, defined as the return investors expected 
















c r  is the 30-year GNMA current-coupon bond-equivalent yield,  0 π  is the TIPS spread 
measure of inflation expectations,  0 r  is the constant-maturity 10-year T-note yield,  0 ρ  is the 
yield of the on-the-run 10-year TIPS, and  0 κ  is the equity risk premium as defined above.  
Expression (3) essentially translates the term  00 (/)
c rrk ⋅  from equation (2) into the real world of 
inflation. 
We calculate the equity risk premium from the Gordon (1962) growth model, which states 
that the expected real return on equity for the representative investor equals the sum of the 
market's dividend yield and the long-run rate of growth of real GDP per capita.  Because this 
expected return must equal the sum of the TIPS yield and the equity risk premium, as defined 
above, it follows that the equity risk premium equals the sum of the dividend yield and the 
long-run growth rate of real GDP per capita, less the TIPS yield.  We set the long-run growth rate 
of real GDP per capita at 2 percent, the post-WW II average.  See the appendix for a description 
of the variables and the data sources.   Monetary Policy Actions and the Incentive to Invest – January 23, 2004 - Page 9 of 14 
The Recent Experience 
Chart 1 depicts, since 1997, our estimate of the option-adjusted discount rate (or real 
marginal cost of capital) for the U.S. corporate sector, the on-the-run TIPS yield, and the value of 
waiting to invest.  The option-adjusted discount rate (shown analytically in expression (3) above) 
was about 5 percent in early 1997 and had declined modestly to about 4½ percent by the 
beginning of 2001.  There had been no further net decrease in this rate by early 2003, despite 
aggressive easing of monetary policy.  Only by mid-2003 did the real cost of capital drop 
significantly below 4 percent.  Meanwhile, the level of real business fixed investment spending 
(not shown) declined by 11 percent between the fourth quarter of 2000 and the fourth quarter of 
2002.  Why did the real option-adjusted cost of capital decline so little, and why did investment 
spending not respond to Fed easing?  The answer to both questions, we suggest, is the increased 
value of waiting to invest during this period. 
As the economy fell into recession during early 2001, the Federal Reserve began an 
aggressive campaign to stimulate the economy—including business fixed investment.  The Fed 
cut the federal funds rate target 12 times by a cumulative 525 basis points during 2001 and 2002.  
The real long-term Treasury yield (the TIPS yield) fell from about 3½ percent at the beginning of 
2001 to around 2 percent by the end of 2002.  Conventional models of monetary policy and 
investment would conclude that monetary policy had been successful in lowering real long-term 
interest rates significantly, and that we should expect a strong surge in fixed investment. 
Recall, however, that firms with investment projects that can be delayed will consider not 
just the present values of cash flows beginning today, but also the present values of the same cash 
flows beginning tomorrow.  We define the value of waiting as the ratio of callable to non-callable 
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to waiting, this ratio is always greater than unity.  This does not mean that all projects should be 
delayed indefinitely (Ingersoll and Ross, 1992).  Rather, a project should be delayed only if the 
value of waiting exceeds the NPV of investing today. 
The value of waiting, shown in Chart 1, first spiked upward in late 1998 at the time of the 
Russian default and the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management.  It is reasonable to believe 
that uncertainty about the future path of interest rates increased at this time.  The value of waiting 
remained somewhat elevated with no clear trend up or down until the second half of 2002.  At 
that point, the delay option again spiked upward—perhaps related to the turmoil surrounding 
corporate governance scandals and the accompanying stock-market decline.  In our framework, 
the relevant uncertainty concerns the time-path of interest rates.  Pervasive economic and 
financial turmoil during 2002 plausibly increased this interest-rate uncertainty.  As it turns out, 
the sharp increase in the value of waiting entirely negated the declining real long-term Treasury 
yield for some time.  Only during the first half of 2003 did further declines in the TIPS yield 
coincide with a gradual, but erratic, decline in the value of the option of waiting to invest (due to 
decreased uncertainty about the path of interest rates).  Thus, the failure of business fixed 
investment to respond to aggressive monetary policy actions during 2001 and 2002 may be due to 
the interest-rate uncertainty that shows up in our estimate of the value of waiting.  Clearly, 
another reason for the sluggish response of business fixed investment to monetary easing might 
have been the increase in the equity risk premium.  Over the time period in question, the equity 
risk premium, κρ =−+
gdp dg , increased as the dividend yield, d , rose (due to a decline in the 
stock market valuation) and the real long-term default-free rate (the 10-year TIPS yield), ρ , 
dropped.  (The long-term growth prospects of the economy, 
gdp g , can be assumed to be immune 
to the business cycle.)  Indeed, as argued by Campbell and Cochrane (1999), investors are less   Monetary Policy Actions and the Incentive to Invest – January 23, 2004 - Page 11 of 14 
risk-tolerant and, hence, demand a larger equity risk premium during recession than during 
expansion. 
Conclusion 
The link between monetary policy actions and business fixed investment is difficult to 
discern from empirical data.  We have shown that there is a clear theoretical link between the real 
(that is, inflation-adjusted) mortgage and Treasury rates and fixed investment.  Unfortunately, 
yields on inflation-indexed mortgage-backed securities are not widely available because Ginnie 
Mae does not issue such securities.  We approximated this rate, however, and showed that 
changes in the ratio of GNMA and Treasury yields, combined with other financial-market 
information, allow decisionmakers and policymakers to gauge (albeit imperfectly) the impact of 
monetary policy actions on the incentive to invest.   Monetary Policy Actions and the Incentive to Invest – January 23, 2004 - Page 12 of 14 
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Appendix:  Description of Variables 
c r : Callable long-term default-free rate, measured by the current-coupon bond-equivalent 
GNMA 30-year yield; biweekly; source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve. 
r : Nominal long-term default-free rate, measured by the constant-maturity 10-year Treasury 
note yield; daily; source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve. 
ρ : Real long-term default-free rate, measured by the yield of the on-the-run 10-year 
Treasury inflation-indexed security; daily; source: New York Times. 
π  : Expected rate of inflation, measured by the difference in 10-year constant maturity 
yields between nominal off-the-run Treasury securities and inflation-indexed Treasury securities, 
calculated from smoothed zero-coupon yield curves; source: Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve. 
κ  : Equity risk premium, calculated as follows: κρ =−+
gdp dg . 
d  : Dividend yield, measured by the dividend yield of the S&P 500 Stock Price Index using 
4-quarter trailing dividends; monthly; source: Standard & Poor's. 
gdp g  : Long-term growth rate of real GDP per capita, set at 2 percent (average growth rate 
of real GDP per capita from 1946 to 2002); source: Bureau of Economic Analysis.   Monetary Policy Actions and the Incentive to Invest – January 23, 2004 - Page 14 of 14 
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Note:  Weekly observations; first observation: Week of Monday 01/07/1999; last observation: 
Week of Monday 12/18/2003.
 